A partir del contrapeso que Ortega encuentra en la contradictoria vida de Goethe, se atreve con una nueva definición para la biografía como interrelación de tres elementos que se enfrentan: circunstancia, vocación y azar. Con lo que la enmarca en su propuesta filosófica, desde su ontología, como drama, como género literario, con ese matiz de construcción, que pretende ser una propuesta más audaz que la del ser idealista, porque incluye el entorno en el yo. Como una ética del ser que (...) se enmarca, como escribió ya Aranguren, en una metafísica de nuestra vida, que Ortega entiende como quehacer. (shrink)

La autonomía del arte es un punto de partida común para forjar una significación para el arte de vanguardias. Con ella, los manifiestos y estudios críticos apuntan lecturas epistemológicas y sociales, que parten necesariamente de una reflexión desde la ontología, sobre la naturaleza de ese arte. Pero Ortega se queda sólo en lo ontológico para hacer del arte una entidad de naturaleza radicalmente distinta a la realidad del espectador. Porque lo que pretende es hacer orbitar también el arte -con las (...) vanguardias (desde la autoconciencia de autónomas que él les supone)- en torno al eje de su filosofía, como mecanismo de evasión de la realidad radical que es para cada individuo su propia vida. (shrink)

The work of the American educator and academic Arland D. Weeks (1871–1936) constitutes an interesting effort to contribute to the reform of society on the basis of an adequate knowledge of the human mind. He was a political progressivist, and his writings are representative of the prevailing pragmatist, functionalist ‘spirit of the times’. Deeply concerned with the making of good citizens, he approached the field of work with a critical eye, making specific recommendations and proposals for improving the efficiency and (...) fostering the personal development of the individual worker. The aim of this article is to analyse such proposals in the light both of their psychological bases and of the ideological and social environment to which they were addressed. (shrink)

The first studies in Philosophy that studied digital technology did not specify the characteristics of its various technical applications or instruments. They looked at the virtual reality and used the metaphor of immersion to study the set of all technological developments, as had been done before with the novel. Thus, Internet is misunderstood by many experts as virtuality (next to Baudrillard), rather than linking its hypertext system closer to other theories like those proposed by Deleuze and Guattari or Bourriaud.

Este artículo propone reunir a la literatura y la filosofía en un mecanismo didáctico para estimular la práctica de la filosofía con la lectura y la escritura de relatos, con los postulados del constructivismo, en torno a hacer filosofía, no solo observarla desde fuera. Parte de dos premisas: 1) el cuento moderno funciona como pregunta filosófica, como presentador de los grandes temas filosóficos, pero 2) evita la tentación de una explicación explícita, que queda elidida, para que sea el lector quien (...) acabe dándole una forma definitiva con su interpretación, participando en la construcción de su significado. (shrink)

Ortega, aunque comprime su metafísica hasta formularla con su “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia”, no escribe apenas de esa circunstancia: de su condición y posibles aspectos. Del binomio con que explica la vida trabaja solo en la reacción del individuo, convertida su propuesta metafísica en una ética que confía en las fuerzas del sujeto para desarrollar su proyecto vital en cualquier entorno. Aún es de día, que publica Miguel Delibes en 1949, con la España de posguerra de fondo, puede (...) leerse como una réplica a esta ética que Ortega llama de la ilusión: Su protagonista, ante una circunstancia abiertamente hostil, es incapaz de desarrollar el programa que quiere para su vida. La trama funciona como planteamiento de una ética que recalcula las posibilidades del individuo para realizarse en un entorno adverso. (shrink)

RESUMENLa analogía de Ortega del actor arrojado a un escenario no supone, como se ha sugerido en distintos trabajos, la inclusión de su metafísica en el entorno del tópico que entiende el mundo como un teatro. La identificación del individuo con un actor que debe transformarse en el personaje que perfila su vocación implica una concepción de mi vida, entendida como creación propia, opuesta a la del theatrum mundi, donde al actor le es asignado un papel ya escrito que debe (...) representar dócilmente. Con todo, su definición del actor como metáfora corporizada converge –o puede llegar a converger- con su noción metafísica del hombre como existencial metáfora. Aunque Ortega no es explícito en este punto.PALABRAS CLAVE«IDEA DEL TEATRO», THEATRUM MUNDI, VOCACIÓN, RES DRAMÁTICA, METÁ- FORA CORPORIZADAABSTRACTOrtega’s analogy of the actor who is thrown into a scenario does not imply the inclusion of his metaphysics in the literary topic that understands the world as a theatre. Ortega identifies the person as an actor who must become the character that his vocation writes. This implies a conception of «my life», understood as my creation, which is contrary to the Theatrum Mundi’s, in which the actor is assigned a previously written role. However his definition of the actor as embodied metaphor could converge with its metaphysical notion of man as an existential metaphor. Ortega is not explicit on this point, though.KEYWORDS«THE IDEA OF THEATRE», THEATRUM MUNDI, VOCATION, RES DRAMATICA, EMBODIED METAPHOR. (shrink)

Ortega presenta su metafísica como un sistema de imágenes alrededor de la novela como metáfora de la vida. Pero confunde el sujeto y el objeto referenciales en su explicación de la vida como acción, porque previamente no ha trabajado lo suficiente en su estética el personaje. Zambrano, en cambio, sí tiene una reflexión propia del personaje que le permite moverse mejor en la analogía, verle más aspectos. Por ejemplo, el envés desde la ética de la condición de proyectivo del hombre (...) : para Zambrano una actitud reprobable como comportamiento buscado, el sacrificio de la vida a un esquema preconcebido reductor. Lo que llama «novelería» en su lectura de la Nina de Galdós. (shrink)

Since the publication of Truth, Paul Horwich’s ‘Minimalism’ has become the paradigm of what goes under the label ‘the deflationary conception of truth’. Despite the many theoretical virtues of Horwich’s minimalism, it is usually contended that it cannot fully account for the normative role that truth plays in enquiry. As I see it, this concern amounts to several challenges. One such challenge—call it the axiological challenge—is about whether deflationists have the theoretical resources to explain the value of truth. Some philosophers (...) have argued that they do not. The thought is that by being valuable in the way it is, truth plays a non-trivial explanatory role with respect to core phenomena of enquiry. In order to account for this aspect of truth, the challenge goes, we need to inflate truth’s nature to an extent incompatible with core tenets of the minimalist conception. In this paper, I first provide some clarifications of what we mean exactly when we say that truth is valuable. By borrowing important distinction from the current debate in axiology, I elaborate a framework within which to conduct investigations into the value of truth. With reference to Horwich’s discussion of the issue, I then discuss the link between questions concerning the explanatory role of truth and the issue of its metaphysical inflation. I conclude by briefly exploring a few strategies on behalf of minimalists to address the axiological challenge. (shrink)

This Companion provides a fresh and comprehensive account of this outstanding work, which remains among the most frequently read works of Greek philosophy, indeed of Classical antiquity in general. The sixteen essays, by authors who represent various academic disciplines, bring a spectrum of interpretive approaches to bear in order to aid the understanding of a wide-ranging audience, from first-time readers of the Republic who require guidance, to more experienced readers who wish to explore contemporary currents in the work’s interpretation. The (...) three initial chapters address aspects of the work as a whole. They are followed by essays that match closely the sequence in which topics are presented in the ten books of the Republic. Since the Republic returns frequently to the same topics by different routes, so do the authors of this volume, who provide the readers with divergent yet complementary perspectives by which to appreciate the Republic’s principal concerns. (shrink)

In this paper I offer some critical comments to MacFarlane's recent book "Assessment Sensitivity". I focus primarily on MacFarlane's understanding of the normative aspects of enquiry—in particular I take issue with the phenomena of retraction and disagreement as preclusion of joint accuracy. I argue that both notions are problematic and that—at least in the case of basic taste—they are not needed in order to account for our intuitions.

Is truth itself natural? This is an important question for both those working on truth and those working on naturalism. For theorists of truth, answering the question of whether truth is natural will tell us more about the nature of truth (or lack of it), and the relations between truth and other properties of interest. For those working on naturalism, answering this question is of paramount importance to those who wish to have truth as part of the natural order. In (...) this paper, we focus primarily on the kinds of theories of truth that occupy the central positions in current debates about truth, namely correspondence theories, deflationary theories, epistemic theories, and pluralist theories, and aim to discern the extent to which truth is a natural property on each view. (shrink)

Empathy is the phenomenal experience of mirroring ourselves into others. It can be explained in terms of simulations of actions, sensations, and emotions which constitute a shared manifold for intersubjectivity. Simulation, in turn, can be sustained at the subpersonal level by a series of neural mirror matching systems.

The production, manipulation and exploitation of future visions are increasingly important elements in practices of visioneering socio-technical processes of innovation and transformation. This becomes obvious in new and emerging science and technologies and large-scale transformations of established socio-technical systems. A variety of science and technology studies provide evidence on correlations between expectations and anticipatory practices with the dynamics of such processes of change. Technology assessment responded to the challenges posed by the influence of visions on the processes by elaborating methodologies (...) for a “vision assessment” as a contribution to what is now increasingly known as “hermeneutical TA”. But until now, the practical functions of visions in the processes have not been explained in a way that satisfies the empirical needs of TA’s vision assessment—that is to provide future-oriented knowledge based on the analysis of ongoing changes in the present without knowing the future outcomes. Our leading hypothesis is that we can only understand the practical roles of visions in current processes if we analyse them as socio-epistemic practices which simultaneously produce new knowledge and enable new social arrangements. We elaborate this by means of two cases: the visions of In Vitro meat and of the smart grid. Here, we interpret visioneering more in its collective dimension as a contingent and open-ended process, emerging from heterogeneous socio-epistemic practices. This paper aims at improving TA’s vision assessments and related STS research on visionary practices for real-time analysis and assessments. (shrink)

Educational neuroscience promises to incorporate emerging insights from neuroscience into education, and is an exiting renovation of cognitive science in education. But unlike cognitive neuroscience—which aims to explain how the mind is embodied—educational neuroscience necessarily incorporates values that reflect the kind of citizen and the kind of society we aspire to create. Neuroscience can help fulfill the mandate of public education, but only as a tool that is part of a broader conversation about what schools should strive to achieve for (...) the millions of students who attend them. I propose that educational neuroscience must advance our understanding of how knowledge is embodied in light of efforts to promote personal learning and development. (shrink)

A proof is given that the set of maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property and the set of maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunction property and the explicit definability property have the power of continuum. To prove our results, we introduce various notions which might be interesting by themselves. In particular, we illustrate a method to generate wide sets of pairwise "constructively incompatible constructive logics". We use a notion of "semiconstructive" logic and define wide sets of "constructive" (...) logics by representing the "constructive" logics as "limits" of decreasing sequences of "semiconstructive" logics. Also, we introduce some generalizations of the usual filtration techniques for propositional logics. For instance, "filtrations over rank formulas" are used to show that any two different logics belonging to a suitable uncountable set of "constructive" logics are "constructively incompatible". (shrink)

Radical relativism was born with a promise: to account for certain phenomena that opposite views are unable to explain. One example is the phenomenon of “faultless disagreement”, according to which two people, while disagreeing, are not at fault in any substantive way. The phenomena of retraction and assessments of truth in cases of eavesdropping are others. All these phenomena have been claimed to pose serious problems for rival views and be best accounted for within a radical relativistic framework. While “faultless (...) disagreement” and the notion of disagreement in general has benefited from extensive discussion in current debates over semantic content, retraction has not been in the spotlight that much. In particular, very few things have been said about what retraction exactly amounts to and how to conceive of its normative profile. This will be the focus of our paper. (shrink)

In this talk I consider a body of my more recent work in order to isolate the shared approach that it takes to reading Platonic dialogue, an approach which had been absent from my writing on Plato up to that point and is largely absent from any of the traditions that influence how most of us read Plato. Its key feature is a refusal to treat the character Socrates as operating as if he were Plato’s secret agent within the dialogue—as (...) if one should attribute to Socrates all of the cunning and the control with which one might credit instead the author who scripted Socrates’s habitual triumphs. The focus of this new approach is rather on Plato’s “writerly” philosophizing: on how Plato exploits the distinction between what he and his character Socrates are up to as philosophers in order to guide our sense of his own activity and aims as a philosophic writer. (shrink)

Let us think about metaphysics not as the subject matter of a discipline—as classical rationalism puts it—but as the “natural place” that arouses our curiosity. Let us see in it something that completes and exceeds, shelters and disables, inspires and invalidates all the questions raised by the effect of a primeval impulse. Rather than metaphysics we should hence speak of “the metaphysical,” a horizon rather than a form of knowledge which vainlessly tries to emulate divine wisdom, we are forced to (...) ponder our point of view, the inquisitive gaze cast on that horizon, not so much as determining a position—since horizons tend to dissipate positions, to blur all point of references—but as a sign revealing a disposition, i.e., the trace of an attitude. As an attitude, this dis-position is a disruption or decentering of our habitual positions concerning the world and a bias that stimulates us to demand another kind of responses to questions which obviously are not those of every day. (shrink)

La gestión de la pandemia de COVID-19 por parte de los países occidentales es uno de los temas más controvertidos de los estudios sociales actuales. Uno de los conceptos centrales para analizar la ordenación de la gestión de la pandemia es el de Cosmopolítica, ya que nos permite ampliar la comprensión de la política para incluir a los ciudadanos, a los seres vivos no humanos, a los elementos terrestres y al propio SARS-CoV-2. Pero como argumentamos en este artículo, la cosmopolítica (...) necesita un poder previo, una potentia generativa que emana de la disposición de los actores mencionados. A partir del ejemplo de los meses en que se desarrolló y comenzó a inocularse la vacuna contra la COVID-19, ilustraremos la propuesta cosmoética: una ética afirmativa que tiñe y permea el agenciamiento de actores que constituyen la vacuna, permitiendo su despliegue para un posterior momento cosmopolítica. De este modo, concluimos que la gestión de la pandemia necesita no sólo atender a los ciudadanos no expertos o a los actores no humanos, sino también atender a la emergencia de nuevas realidades, tiempos y espacios. (shrink)

Los dos grandes problemas del enfoque supervaluacionista para la vaguedad son determinar cuáles son las precisificaciones admisibles y la vaguedad de orden superior ilimitado. Apelando al uso de los términos vagos por lo comunidad lingüística competente puede dividirse de forma tajante la extensión de un término precisando en que casos se aplica definidamente, en cuáles se aplica indefinidamente y en cuales es indeterminado si se aplica. Esto produce dos órdenes de vaguedad, con lo que se bloquean los argumentos sorites. Finalmente (...) se indaga qué semántica resulta más adecuada para una vaguedad de segundo orden. La vaguedad se basa en una indeterminación determinada en la aplicación de ciertos términos por parte de los hablantes nativos. (shrink)

En este artículo se presenta una ontología según la cual el mundo actual no es el único real, pero, al contrario que en la ontología de Lewis, no todos los mundos son reales, porque muchos de ellos siguen siendo mundos meramente posibles. Tras examinar cuidadosamente los pros y contras de los diferentes tipos de actualismo y posibilismo, esta nueva concepción posibilista (el multiposibilismo actual) es elaborada y defendida contra algunas objeciones. El punto de partida es que los mundos posibles sí (...) que incluyen individuos no actuales, y no únicamente estados de cosas no actualizados acerca de individuos actuales. Y el núcleo de la teoría consiste en conceder que muchos mundos son reales por igual, y ontológica y nomológicamente independientes entre sí, pero que la mayoría de ellos genera su propia serie de mundos posibles pero no actualizados inter-relacionados. De esta manera, permanecen intactas nuestras inuiciones metafísicas más profundas (como la identidad transmundana, la contingencia -tanto lógica como metafísica- del mundo actual, o los principios de la lógica clásica), pero existe una respuesta a la pregunta: "¿por qué precisamente el mundo actual es el real?" al negar que solamente él sea real. Al final del artículo se ponen de manifiesto algunas de las ventajas y del potencial ontológico y teológico de esta hipótesis. (shrink)

La creencia en la resurrección de los muertos es central para las religiones abrahámicas. Al estar actualmente desacreditada la noción de alma, muchos filósofos cristianos materialistas se replantean la posibilidad de tal resurrección. Dos problemas fundamentales amenazan tal posibilidad: la discontinuidad espacio-temporal entre la muerte y la resurrección (que impediría esta última si fuera imposible una existencia intermitente para los seres humanos) y la degeneración, disgregación o incluso completa destrucción de los componentes materiales del cuerpo (que impediría la reconstrucción del (...) cuerpo original). Ambas cuestiones ponen en peligro la identidad numérica entre la persona muerta y la resucitada. Tras examinar diversas hipótesis recientes que intentan superar estas dificultades, constato que, o bien recurren a ideas disparatadas para asegurar la identidad, o asumen directamente que el cuerpo resucitado es una mera copia del original. Así, concluyo que, supuesta una concepción puramente corporalista de la persona, no parece viable ninguna noción de resurrección que preserve la identidad personal. (shrink)